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C00002 00002	In reading your thesis, I am constantly having to search for where
C00005 00003	4-20 It's a bit late to be making this point, but the relationship
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In reading your thesis, I am constantly having to search for where
a notation was defined.  Currently I am searching for H.  I suggest
you prepare an index of symbols and notations and MAIL me a copy.  It
should be included in the thesis along with the list of axioms.
It could also take the form of repeating the definitions of the
notations if this can be done concisely enough.
An index of notations is badly needed.

Let me extend my request for an index of symbols.  The appendix that
contains the axioms all together should contain a summary of the kinds
of entities that are admitted, i.e. what domains there are and for
each functions where its arguments and result are located.

	I am not convinced that effective reasoning about knowledge and
action requires all three of the kinds of facts mentioned on p6 of the
introduction.  Different levels of awareness (alias introspective
knowledge or self consciousness) are required for different classes of
tasks, and you should analyze this rather than fall into the pit
(inhabited by all philosophers I know about) of trying to give a single
notion of knowing the connection between knowledge and action.

	For example, item 2 (knowing that an action has been performed)
can be omitted without loss if the possibilities of the new situation are
observable.

	On the other hand, we might add that A must know before he
performs Act that he will know afterwards whether Q is true.
4-20 It's a bit late to be making this point, but the relationship
between P and :P takes us out of standard first order logic, so
how do we know that the resulting system is consistent?  Moreover,
even if it is consistent as a bare system, how do we know that
extremely plausible axioms, formalizing uncontroversial facts about
the world won't make it inconsistent by interacting with
features of the language-metalanguage system in an unexpected way.

4-20 I think I agree with the engineering view of essentialism
proposed here.  My own philosophical view is that no particular
essential property is necessary.  We can work with a system in
which it is possible that 5 is a chair.  Doing so is inconvenient
and it probably forces us to a higher level of abstraction, introducing
entities which are otherwise unnecessary and which probably have
essential properties of their own.  Thus essentialism can be forced
to retreat, but it can't be conquered.  Some non-monotonic reasoning
may be helpful - a property may be regarded as essential unless
this assertion is questioned.  The above is a digression from
commentary on the thesis itself, and I know it is vague.

4-21 I can't help thinking that there is a type conflict between
the two formulas for D(w1,Cnst), i.e. V(w1,:Cnst) and :Cnst.
Likewise for functions.

5-1 Should it be "A First order theory of knowledge and action" instead
of "A first order logic of knowledge and action".  The second would
imply that the logic was conventional, and I think this is intended
to be the case.